Il report gratuito di Financial Markets LAB!

Si chiama Financial Markets LAB Newsletter ed è il mio report GRATUITO di ricerca ed analisi in materia di investimenti sui mercati finanziari contenente notizie, commenti, curiosità ed approfondimenti sull'andamento dei principali mercati finanziari.

Puoi riceverlo nella Tua mail mandando una richiesta all'indirizzo:

finmklab@yahoo.it

AUTORIZZAZIONE AL TRATTAMENTO DEI DATI PERSONALI INFORMATIVA AI SENSI DELL'ART. 13 DEL D.LGS 196 DEL 30 GIUGNO 2003 (Tutela delle persone e di altri soggetti rispetto al trattamento dei dati personali) - Il blog Financial Markets LAB desidera informare i propri lettori, ai sensi dell'articolo 13 del D.Lgs. 30 giugno 2003, n. 196, che i dati personali che li riguardano, raccolti in occasione della sottoscrizione della Financial Markets LAB Newsletter gratuita, saranno oggetto di trattamento ai sensi della legge sopraindicata. Si leggano a questo proposito i dettagli riportati nello spazio apposito, intitolato Privacy, in questa stessa pagina.


sabato 13 dicembre 2008

DAL LABORATORIO DEI MERCATI FINANZIARI - Bernanke vs deflazione


Questa volta voglio commentare un vecchio di discorso di Ben Bernanke, tenuto il 21 novembre 2002 davanti al National Economists Club di Washington (notate che siccome si va un po indietro nel tempo ho messo una vecchia foto di Bernanke! Forse un po anni 70....); il discorso in questione si intitola: “Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here”.
In quel discorso, come vedremo in questo post, possiamo ritrovare:

1) diverse affermazioni che lette oggi sembrano davvero incredibili e ci forniscono una tragicomica spiegazione della crisi economica e finanziaria in atto.
2) Le possibili medicine che la Fed darà in pasto “all’ammalata economia statunitense” per cercare di guarirla dai sintomi della deflazione.
Per chi fosse interessato a leggere l’intero discorso allego il link:

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm

Cominciamo a commentare alcuni passi che reputo davvero salienti.

“So, is deflation a threat to the economic health of the United States? Not to leave you in suspense, I believe that the chance of significant deflation in the United States in the foreseeable future is extremely small, for two principal reasons. The first is the resilience and structural stability of the U.S. economy itself. Over the years, the U.S. economy has shown a remarkable ability to absorb shocks of all kinds, to recover, and to continue to grow. Flexible and efficient markets for labor and capital, an entrepreneurial tradition, and a general willingness to tolerate and even embrace technological and economic change all contribute to this resiliency. A particularly important protective factor in the current environment is the strength of our financial system: Despite the adverse shocks of the past year, our banking system remains healthy and well-regulated, and firm and household balance sheets are for the most part in good shape.The second bulwark against deflation in the United States, and the one that will be the focus of my remarks today, is the Federal Reserve System itself. The Congress has given the Fed the responsibility of preserving price stability (among other objectives), which most definitely implies avoiding deflation as well as inflation. I am confident that the Fed would take whatever means necessary to prevent significant deflation in the United States and, moreover, that the U.S. central bank, in cooperation with other parts of the government as needed, has sufficient policy instruments to ensure that any deflation that might occur would be both mild and brief.”
Nel 2002 Bernanke riteneva improbabile che si verificassero fenomeni deflativi grazie a due elementi di positività: da un lato la flessibilità dell’economia Usa, capace di assorbire shocks esterni anche di grossa portata; effettivamente il Vecchio Continente ha solo da imparare dalle caratteristiche di estrema flessibilità dell’economia a stelle e strisce, a partire proprio dal mercato del lavoro (pensiamo a quello che è successo in Italia con la riforma Biagi e alla levata di scudi di una certa parte della sinistra marxista più retrograda ed atavica, giustamente spazzata via nelle ultime elezioni politiche). Dall’altro l’attuale Presidente della Fed enfatizza la forza del sistema finanziario e, avete tradotto bene, la salute del sistema bancario; non solo, dice che il sistema bancario è ben regolato! Queste parole, a distanza di soli 6 anni sembrano totalmente sballate ma, secondo me, ci danno alcune importanti lezioni; innanzitutto, le Banche Centrali non sanno prevedere il futuro; in secondo luogo, non c’è regolamentazione che tenga di fronte all’ingordigia umana; il basso livello dei tassi di interesse ha spinto negli scorsi anni le banche ad ingegnarsi per guadagnare, facendo credito a chi non poteva indebitarsi e a rivendere tali crediti impacchettandoli con nastri colorati e carta luccicante per attrarre altra speculazione finanziaria. Di fronte alla ricerca di profitto ad ogni costo il sistema di controllo e di risk management ha mostrato tutti i suoi limiti.
Inoltre, oggi, con questa crisi finanziaria in atto, siccome il sistema finanziario Usa non è in salute, è venuta meno una delle condizioni di salvaguardia dalla deflazione, citate da Bernanke.
Ecco perché la Fed ha annunciato il ricorso a misure di quantitative easing e gli annunci che verranno fatti nella imminente riunione della Fed sono estremamente importanti e ci daranno la misura dell’impegno della Banca Centrale Usa per scongiurare il rischio deflazionistico alle porte.
Bernanke cita poi la Fed quale baluardo contro i rischi di deflazione ed il fatto che il Congresso Usa ha dato mandato alla Banca Centrale di perseguire con ogni mezzo l’obiettivo della stabilità dei prezzi. “Con ogni mezzo” significa in una sola e semplice frase: inondare di liquidità il sistema.

“Deflation of sufficient magnitude may result in the nominal interest rate declining to zero or very close to zero. Once the nominal interest rate is at zero, no further downward adjustment in the rate can occur, since lenders generally will not accept a negative nominal interest rate when it is possible instead to hold cash. At this point, the nominal interest rate is said to have hit the "zero bound."

La Fed ha portato i Fed funds all’1% con una serie di repentini tagli dei tassi e, se faccio un raffronto con quello che era successo in Giappone nel corso dei primi anni ’90 bisogna dare atto alla Banca Centrale statunitense di aver agito in modo nettamente più tempestivo.
Se invece vado a vedere alcune variabili di politica monetaria noto che, se da un lato la base monetaria è salita in modo verticale, dall’altro la velocità di circolazione della moneta è in netto calo; in altre parole:”il cavallo non beve!!”; le banche sono ancora riluttanti a svolgere il loro compito primario, cioè a prestare denaro alle aziende. Invece di utilizzare la liquidità fornita dalla Fed per aumentare il credito, usano il denaro per acquistare titoli di stato, rendendo vani i tentativi della Banca Centrale Americana di “rianimare il malato”.
Siamo di fatto in una situazione di “trappola della liquidità” come vi dicevo nel precedente post
http://financialmarketslab.blogspot.com/2008/12/dal-laboratorio-dei-mercati-finanziari_06.html

First, when the nominal interest rate has been reduced to zero, the real interest rate paid by borrowers equals the expected rate of deflation, however large that may be. To take what might seem like an extreme example (though in fact it occurred in the United States in the early 1930s), suppose that deflation is proceeding at a clip of 10 percent per year. Then someone who borrows for a year at a nominal interest rate of zero actually faces a 10 percent real cost of funds, as the loan must be repaid in dollars whose purchasing power is 10 percent greater than that of the dollars borrowed originally. In a period of sufficiently severe deflation, the real cost of borrowing becomes prohibitive. Capital investment, purchases of new homes, and other types of spending decline accordingly, worsening the economic downturn.”

Bernanke descrive egregiamente gli effetti della deflazione sui soggetti indebitati: il tasso di interesse reale pagato dai debitori in un contesto deflazionistico è uguale al tasso atteso di deflazione; ecco perchè la Fed sta cercando di abbassare i tassi sui mortgages e in generale i tassi a lungo termine.

Curing Deflation
"As I have mentioned, some observers have concluded that when the central bank's policy rate falls to zero--its practical minimum--monetary policy loses its ability to further stimulate aggregate demand and the economy. At a broad conceptual level, and in my view in practice as well, this conclusion is clearly mistaken. Indeed, under a fiat (that is, paper) money system, a government (in practice, the central bank in cooperation with other agencies) should always be able to generate increased nominal spending and inflation, even when the short-term nominal interest rate is at zero. So what then might the Fed do if its target interest rate, the overnight federal funds rate, fell to zero? One relatively straightforward extension of current procedures would be to try to stimulate spending by lowering rates further out along the Treasury term structure--that is, rates on government bonds of longer maturities. There are at least two ways of bringing down longer-term rates, which are complementary and could be employed separately or in combination. One approach, similar to an action taken in the past couple of years by the Bank of Japan, would be for the Fed to commit to holding the overnight rate at zero for some specified period. Because long-term interest rates represent averages of current and expected future short-term rates, plus a term premium, a commitment to keep short-term rates at zero for some time--if it were credible--would induce a decline in longer-term rates. A more direct method, which I personally prefer, would be for the Fed to begin announcing explicit ceilings for yields on longer-maturity Treasury debt (say, bonds maturing within the next two years). The Fed could enforce these interest-rate ceilings by committing to make unlimited purchases of securities up to two years from maturity at prices consistent with the targeted yields. If this program were successful, not only would yields on medium-term Treasury securities fall, but (because of links operating through expectations of future interest rates) yields on longer-term public and private debt (such as mortgages) would likely fall as well. Lower rates over the maturity spectrum of public and private securities should strengthen aggregate demand in the usual ways and thus help to end deflation. Of course, if operating in relatively short-dated Treasury debt proved insufficient, the Fed could also attempt to cap yields of Treasury securities at still longer maturities, say three to six years. Yet another option would be for the Fed to use its existing authority to operate in the markets for agency debt (for example, mortgage-backed securities issued by Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association). If lowering yields on longer-dated Treasury securities proved insufficient to restart spending, however, the Fed might next consider attempting to influence directly the yields on privately issued securities. Unlike some central banks, and barring changes to current law, the Fed is relatively restricted in its ability to buy private securities directly. However, the Fed does have broad powers to lend to the private sector indirectly via banks, through the discount window. Therefore a second policy option, complementary to operating in the markets for Treasury and agency debt, would be for the Fed to offer fixed-term loans to banks at low or zero interest, with a wide range of private assets (including, among others, corporate bonds, commercial paper, bank loans, and mortgages) deemed eligible as collateral. For example, the Fed might make 90-day or 180-day zero-interest loans to banks, taking corporate commercial paper of the same maturity as collateral. Pursued aggressively, such a program could significantly reduce liquidity and term premiums on the assets used as collateral. Reductions in these premiums would lower the cost of capital both to banks and the nonbank private sector, over and above the beneficial effect already conferred by lower interest rates on government securities. The Fed can inject money into the economy in still other ways. For example, the Fed has the authority to buy foreign government debt, as well as domestic government debt. Potentially, this class of assets offers huge scope for Fed operations, as the quantity of foreign assets eligible for purchase by the Fed is several times the stock of U.S. government debt. Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934. The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.
Fiscal Policy
Each of the policy options I have discussed so far involves the Fed's acting on its own. In practice, the effectiveness of anti-deflation policy could be significantly enhanced by cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. A broad-based tax cut, for example, accommodated by a program of open-market purchases to alleviate any tendency for interest rates to increase, would almost certainly be an effective stimulant to consumption and hence to prices. Even if households decided not to increase consumption but instead re-balanced their portfolios by using their extra cash to acquire real and financial assets, the resulting increase in asset values would lower the cost of capital and improve the balance sheet positions of potential borrowers. A money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman's famous "helicopter drop" of money. Of course, in lieu of tax cuts or increases in transfers the government could increase spending on current goods and services or even acquire existing real or financial assets. If the Treasury issued debt to purchase private assets and the Fed then purchased an equal amount of Treasury debt with newly created money, the whole operation would be the economic equivalent of direct open-market operations in private assets.”
Questo è il cuore del discorso di Bernanke in cui ritrovare quelli che saranno i provvedimenti che probabilmente la Fed si appresta ad annunciare in modo dettagliato nella riunione del 15 e 16 dicembre 2008 (sembra che la Banca Centrale abbia volutamente dilatato la durata della riunione).
La Fed deve abbassare i tassi a lungo termine; può cercare di farlo in tanti modi: mettendo un cap ai rendimenti dei titoli di stato; acquistando in modo massiccio titoli di stato. Un altro strumento contro la deflazione è rappresentato dalla politica fiscale; ricorrendo ad un coordinamento con il Governo per l’attuazione di politiche fiscali espansive si può stimolare la domanda ed i consumi (con un conseguente impatto rialzista sui prezzi).
C’è un altro punto interessante: Bernanke è disposto anche a far deprezzare il dollaro per rilanciare l’economia. Che dire? Sell dollars buy Gold……..

Nessun commento:

Posta un commento